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0. Introduction 
 
For decades, the legal form of productive organizations and who assumes the 
role of entrepreneur have been taken as given by the economic literature. However, such 
questions can be considered as a part of the decision set from which the economic 
agents can choose. In fact, this is at the root of research fields like organizational law 
and entrepreneurship. Recently, economists have addressed such kinds of questions. 
One of those contributions is the concept of interpersonal authority and its relation with 
entrepreneurship (Van den Steen, 2010).  
This paper goes one step further by relating interpersonal authority to the 
financial problems usually associated with new firms. A theoretical model is developed 
for understanding the role of differences in beliefs in the creation of a new firm, as well 
as how they are related to the entrepreneur’s financial problems, and the choice of the 
legal form. The model assumptions fit quite well with the “creative destruction” view of 
the entrepreneurs’ role in the economy, as persons that break the initial equilibria with 
path-breaking ideas about how inputs can be combined (Schumpeter, 1939).  
In the model, a new productive activity competes with old ones for the access to 
a certain amount of resources, i.e., inputs. Those resources come from the wealth that 
people invest based on their inter-temporal consumption preferences. The only 
distinction among productive activities is the confidence level that persons have in these 
projects, i.e., the beliefs from which the results of the activities are computed. So, the 
projects that we consider require the same amount of inputs (or total financial support).  
Let us call the person (or group of persons) who is more confident concerning 
the new productive activity (whenever production is organized following that person’s 
instructions) entrepreneur, and assume that the entrepreneur needs financial support. In 
other words, for the entrepreneur it is (a priori) optimal to invest less money than the 
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total financial support required for developing the new productive activity. According to 
people’s inter-temporal consumption preferences, a priori there is an optimal ratio of 
internal (entrepreneur) vs. external (others) funding for the new productive activity.  
Based on differences in beliefs, the model shows that when the rest of the people 
involved (stakeholders) have higher confidence in other productive activities (than in 
the new productive activity), the entrepreneur has to divert resources from consumption 
to investment in order to develop (fund) the new productive activity. In this context, 
capital is the monetary value of the minimum amount of resources that the entrepreneur 
has to divert from consumption to investment in order to develop the new productive 
activity. Assume that the wealth of the entrepreneur is high enough. Then, the new 
productive activity will be developed whenever the opportunity cost of capital is lower 
than the expected profits of the new productive activity. In this case, the ratio of internal 
resources to external ones will be higher than the a priori optimal one (the established 
one when all people involved have the same beliefs as the entrepreneur). 
We compare the capital needed in two different contractual arrangements. In the 
first one, the entrepreneur initially advances certain payments to the creditors. In the 
second, the entrepreneur postpones consumption (to some extent) and establishes a 
public list of creditors’ priorities over the capital and the output finally obtained in the 
production activity. We show that the need of capital is reduced when, in the list of 
creditors, the order of priority decreases with the creditors’ confidence in the project. 
To the best of our knowledge, no model with basically one exogenous variable 
(which in our case consists of differences in beliefs) has endogenously established: 
(i) Who will decide the use of certain inputs (entrepreneur) against alternative uses 
suggested by other persons (authority); 
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(ii) That all of the stakeholders agree that the entrepreneur will have the residual claims 
of the productive activity; 
(iii) That (when differences in beliefs are severe) the entrepreneur has to anticipate 
capital in order to assure the project´s development, and 
(iv) That the existence of a public list of creditors’ priorities for developing such 
activities reduces the volume of capital needed. 
To some extent the model analyzes decisions that become keys in several 
streams of the economic literature: entrepreneurship, theory of the firm, finance, and 
organizational law. The following section relates the model, and its main assumptions, 
with these streams of the literature. Model assumptions are formally stated in Section 2. 
The need of capital is derived in Section 3, and the role of payments priorities is 
analyzed in Section 4. The empirical implications of the model are discussed in Section 
5. Section 6 presents some conclusions and extensions. 
  
1. Related literature 
 
“A large fraction of the founders and chief executives (...) indicated that they 
had a specific organizational model in mind” (Baron, Burton and Hannan, 1999, p. 5). 
The assumption that people can agree to disagree is also implicit in the terms of Vision 
(See Rotemberg and Saloner, 2000, p. 693-695 for more references), The Theory of the 
Business (Drucker, 1994) or Upper Echelons Reflections (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) 
among others. These are just examples that this assumption is well-accepted in the 
managerial literature. 
1.1. Differences in beliefs 
This is not so common among economists; “the consensus of the profession in 
these respects is clear (…). Models in which agents have different priors allow 
 5 
sufficient freedom as to be capable of generating virtually any outcome, while providing 
such insights as different agents behave differently because they have different beliefs” 
(Samuelson, 2004, p. 377). So, the standard assumption based on Auman´s (1976) 
“state-pace” model of knowledge (see Samuelson, 2004, for a review) is that people 
cannot agree to disagree. Obviously, this last conclusion is obtained under the 
assumption that people have the same prior beliefs, and that the probability of an event 
is common knowledge. Kurz (1994 a, b) shows that rational individuals can have 
different beliefs even if they have observed the same historical evidence when they have 
different prior beliefs. Some empirical evidence has been interpreted in favor of the fact 
that differences in beliefs do exist. Parker (2006) provides empirical evidence 
suggesting that entrepreneurs update their prior beliefs to new information much more 
slowly than is theoretically expected. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) provide evidence that 
managers have a significant effect on the way that firms are organized and on their 
performance. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), by investigating the poor 
performance of investment in non-publicly traded U.S. equity, show that entrepreneurs 
may well have different business models in mind. Finally, the existence of markets with 
speculative components can be interpreted as evidence of the existence of different 
beliefs.  
Therefore, we cannot ignore the fact that these differences in beliefs can exist. 
Our proposal is to analyze the optimal contractual arrangements by simply assuming 
that there are differences in beliefs regarding the optimal production activities, and 
assuming nothing else about the nature of those beliefs. This is the approach followed in 
Van den Steen (2010a, 2010b, 2005). 
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We consider “the entrepreneur” as the person (or set of persons) who starts a 
firm. This definition of entrepreneur is quite close to earlier ones (e.g., Cantillon, 1755), 
but almost three centuries of literature have provided many other meanings. Following 
Casson (2010), “two main ways of defining entrepreneurship can be found in the 
literature. One defines the entrepreneur as the founder or owner-manager of a small- or 
medium-size enterprise (SME) with growth potential, whilst the other defines the 
entrepreneur in terms of the economic function that he or she performs”. It is far from 
our purpose to revise such definitions, but we must note that the paper´s contributions 
are conditioned by our definition of entrepreneur. Moreover, for identifying what an 
entrepreneur is, we need to define what a firm is.  
1.2. Entrepreneurship and the theory of the firm 
Hansmann and Kraakman (2000) consider a well-defined decision-making 
authority and its ability to bond its contracts credibly as main attributes of a firm. We 
follow Van den Steen (2010a) quite closely for understanding and modelling decision-
making authority. In fact, we extend his analyses in order to understand how the firm 
bonds its financial contracts credibly. The model builds upon a simplified version of 
Van den Steen (2010a). In fact, we reproduce the basic results related to interpersonal 
authority. In the terms of Van den Steen (2010a, p. 466), “one person has interpersonal 
authority over another if: (i) the first person tells the second what to do, ii) the second 
person tends to act in accord with these instructions, and iii) he often does so against his 
own beliefs or immediate preferences”. He shows that more confident persons will not 
only have this authority; they will also be the asset owners and the residual claimants of 
the production activity or firm.  
So entrepreneurs assume risk (or in other terms, residual claims) even if there 
are no differences in risk aversion among the population. Note that only by assuming 
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differences in people’s attitude towards risk, it has been very difficult to explain 
interpersonal authority. In Van den Steen (2010a), the main driver for being an 
entrepreneur is the relatively high degree of confidence of one person in a particular 
entrepreneurial project. Then, and this feature contrasts with other explanations of 
entrepreneurship, the person who assumes the role of entrepreneur does not need to be 
more self-confident independently of the project selected, nor more optimistic 
independently of who develops a project. However, more optimistic or self-confident 
persons will be more confident in the entrepreneurial project developed. Obviously, 
other reasons (such as knowledge or professional experience) could be behind 
differences in entrepreneurial projects confidence. We will just assume that they exist, 
without analyzing where they come from or the past experience of the entrepreneur. 
There are other theories of the firm (see Gibbons, 2005, for a summary). But 
although the described features are not necessarily the only ones, they seem to be 
among the defining features of a firm, at least for some literature. In Williamson’s 
(2000) terms, unified management is a necessary part of being a firm. This concept is 
quite similar to the interpersonal authority modeled by Van den Steen (2010a), where 
the entrepreneur is associated with the person that exerts this authority. Property rights 
theory usually argues that authority is conferred by ownership of an asset (Grossman 
and Hart, 1986, and Hart and Moore, 1990), but this claim is not fully explained by the 
property rights theory; see Hermalin (1999). Moreover, differences in beliefs offer an 
alternative explanation as to why a formal authority arises and is allocated at the top of 
the hierarchy, something consistent with the idea of “centralization of decision-
making”, suggested by Hermalin (1999) and Williamson (2000) as a defining feature of 
the firm. The ownership of assets is a way to implement such authority, as it can work 
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as a lever to better influence workers’ incentives (Holmstrom, 1999). Van den Steen 
(2010a) presents a detailed discussion of differences with other theories of the firm.  
 
The model contrasts with Van den Steen (2010a) in placing stress on financial 
concerns. A diverging feature (also diverging from other models like that of Hart and 
Moore, 2005) is that Van den Steen (2010a) deals with the initial discrepancies 
regarding the optimal use of inputs rather than with the probabilities of new, future 
ideas. In particular, he considers the possibility of future differences in beliefs regarding 
how assets should be prepared for production, but once they are ready to start 
producing, all team members agree about how that production should be organized. 
Therefore, from the beginning, all payments to which the entrepreneur/owner is 
committed will be lower than the expected team production. In contrast, in our model 
the differences in the agents’ confidence on the finally developed entrepreneurial 
project persist. So, from the very beginning some agents will require payments or 
guarantees of payment, and initial capital is required from the entrepreneur. 
1.3. The firm’s financing 
 
 “Perhaps, the most frequently cited obstacle to business formation is the 
inability of would-be entrepreneurs to acquire the capital necessary to start a business” 
(Hurst and Lusardi, 2004, p. 20). Indeed, much literature has documented a positive 
relationship between initial wealth (or inheritances received in the past) and subsequent 
entry in business.1
The need for financial support in order to finance entrepreneurial projects is 
endogenously derived in our model. This need for financial support is exogenously 
 So we will assume that people are wealth-restricted. 
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imposed in models like those of Boot et al. (2006), Dittmar and Thakor (2007) or Boot 
and Thakor (2011). These papers analyze how differences in managers’ and investors’ 
beliefs might affect stock prices, and then the decision to issue equity in the market as 
opposed to other alternative financial mechanisms, private ownership or debt.  
The need for financial support is instead endogenously derived in De Meza and 
Southey (1996), but differs from our argumentations in several aspects. First, we 
assume that people can have different levels of confidence about the outcome of the 
projects. Second, De Meza and Southey (1996) analyze the decision to become an 
entrepreneur in terms of the degree of personal optimism and wealth. Optimists always 
overestimate the real distribution of earnings and, consequently, they are willing to pay 
more than the expected returns (when optimists become entrepreneurs, the actual 
expected returns of firms are always negative). As our starting point is the existence of 
differences in beliefs, nothing is established a priori about how realistic the predictions 
are, and nothing is assumed about the true distribution of returns.  
There are other differences with De Meza and Southey (1996). As is common in 
the financial literature (Fan and White, 2003, or Evans and Jovanovic, 1989), they 
basically focus on an analysis of the relation between entrepreneurs and a bank with 
unlimited funds, so how are those funds provided is not analyzed. Furthermore, they do 
not take into account the fact that the entrepreneur contracts employees, so the decision 
to become an entrepreneur is not related to other people’s decisions to become 
employees. Since they do not take this relationship into account, nothing can be said 
about firms’ internal organization. Following Evans and Jovanovic’s (1989) arguments, 
initial wealth plays the role of collateral and limits the entrepreneur’s capacity to 
                                                                                                                                               
1 See, for example, Blanchflower and Oswald (1998); Evans and Jovanovic (1989); Evans and Leighton 
(1989); Fairlie (1999); Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994); Quadrini, (1999); Paulson and Towsend (2004) and 
Paulson et al. (2006). 
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borrow. Aghion and Bolton (1997) offer an explanation for the need for such collateral: 
entrepreneurs’ actions cannot be observed by borrowers until the project fails and 
consequently payments are unfeasible. As a result, poor borrowers have little incentive 
to be diligent, and lenders charge higher interest rates to less wealthy borrowers. 
Collateral and self-financing help to solve the problem and this reduces the interest rate 
of the loan. We offer an alternative explanation for the need for such collateral or self-
financing when lenders can perfectly supervise the borrower’s actions. Collateral is 
claimed by those stakeholders who believe that the payments committed by the 
entrepreneur are larger than the firm’s future income, and the firm will not be 
established if entrepreneurs cannot offer enough collateral to guarantee future payments. 
In such a case, and unlike De Meza and Southey (1996), potential workers could finally 
become entrepreneurs. All of these models remain silent concerning the role of 
creditors’ priorities. 
 
Some authors (Robé, 2011) claim that there is some confusion in the economic 
literature, mainly in the agency and property rights theory, between firms and 
corporations. “Corporations are a subset of firms (…). A corporation is characterized by 
a statement of capital contributions as formal claims against the firm’s income (…). 
Equity investors are paid last, after debt investors, employees, and other investors with 
(relatively) fixed claims (…). The corporation is a financing device and is not otherwise 
distinctive. Sometimes, it is said that the distinctive features of the corporation are 
limited liability, legal identity, and perpetual existence, but these are misleading 
descriptions” (Easterbrook and Fischel 1989, p. 1425-6). 
1.4. Firm legal form 
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According to Hansmann and Kraakman (2000), an essential role of 
organizational law is the so-called “asset partitioning” separating those assets of the 
firm from the assets of the owner or managers. “The truly essential aspect of asset 
partitioning is, in effect, the reverse of limited liability- namely, the shielding of the 
assets of the entity from claims of the creditors of the entity’s owners  or managers” (p. 
390). They call this feature “affirmative” asset partitioning in order to differentiate it 
from the “defensive” asset partitioning. “Defensive” asset partitioning is mostly related 
to limited liability; the firm creditors are excluded from making a claim on the owner’s 
assets in case of firm default. Only the “affirmative” asset partitioning is considered 
essential by the authors: “it would generally be infeasible to establish this form of asset 
partitioning without organizational law; and (…) this attribute –essentially a property 
attribute- is the only essential contribution that organizational law makes to commercial 
activity, in the sense that is the only basic attribute of a firm that could not feasibly be 
established by contractual means alone” (p.393). A historical analysis of the evolution 
of the organizational law supports such analyses (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2006). 
The main contribution of our model to this literature is to emphasize a new 
advantage of affirmative partitioning, in particular how the amount of money needed by 
the entrepreneur to establish a firm can be reduced. For formalization convenience, we 
do not consider the existence of personal creditors of the entrepreneur, so “defensive” 
asset partitioning, mostly related to limited liability, is omitted from the analysis. We do 
not claim that this feature (limited liability and, in general, the protection of personal 
creditor rights) is irrelevant, but we do not try to argue regarding the distinctive features 
of the organizational law. Here, it is only claimed that for some authors the firm´s 
creditors’ priorities concerning the firm’s assets is among the most important ones, and 
the model illustrates an advantage of having a list of creditor priorities. 
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For expositional simplicity, the model only considers one productive input that 
we identify with labor. Thus, we speak of market solution when productive activities are 
taken by one person alone, while firm describes the situation where workers are 
contracted for developing productive activities.2 In this last case, and following the 
discussion above, when there is a list of creditor priorities, we will speak of 
corporations; otherwise we speak of sole proprietorship. Although this classification 
does not exhaustively address all of the possible business legal forms, it does cover the 
most important ones. According to the Internal Revenue Service of the US Department 
of the Treasury, there were 27,757,676 businesses in the US in 2007. Only 6,049,655 of 
those have establishments with employees, of which 4,267,818 were corporations and 
627,549 partnerships, while 1,071,873 were sole proprietorship. Most of the firms 
without employees are sole proprietorships.3
Furthermore, the model takes into account the main arguments for the 
incorporation of a firm suggested by Arruñada (2012), the comparison of bureaucratic 
costs with the profits from being registered. We consider that a main difference between 
legal forms is their capability to protect the firm´s creditors and establish priorities 
among them. A corporation helps protect those creditors related to the entrepreneurial 
activity better than to a sole proprietorship, but at higher bureaucratic costs. The model 
does not analyze how the bureaucratic costs are related to creditor protection given that 
 This composition is similar to that of other 
countries. 
                                                 
2 Strictly speaking, our model does not distinguish among productive inputs. So what really distinguishes 
a firm from the market solution is purchasing inputs to other persons for productive activities. In this 
sense our model fits better as a “theory of the firm” (it provides an explanation for the creation of firms) 
than as a “theory of the entrepreneur” (for the model, there are two kinds of self-employed persons: those 
in the “market solution” vs. “firm owners”). 
3 19,089,091 accordingly with the US Census Bureau, while 1,428,932 were corporations and 1,189,998 
partnerships.  
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the purpose of the paper is not to analyze the adoption of a certain legal system. The 
model is centered on firms’ decisions after a legal system has been established.  
The predictions of the model and the empirical evidence go against the standard 
financial life-cycle theory of the firm (Fama and Jensen, 1983a,b), whereby a firm starts 
out as a proprietorship and then changes to a partnership or corporation as it grows and 
needs financing. Based on the Kauffman Firm Surveys data sample, Cole (2011) shows 
that only one-third of firms began as sole proprietorships, which are almost as many as 
corporations. Similar figures are found for the UK (Frankish et al., 2013) and other 
European countries.4
 
 Furthermore, only 10% of firms changed their legal form during 
their first four years of life, most changes occurring in the early years. In fact, the 
existing evidence shows that the legal form is related to the firms’ financial decisions. 
Corporations have more access to bank financing (Storey, 1994) and higher growth 
rates (Storey, 1994; Harhoff et al., 1998).  
2. Model assumptions 
 
In this section the model´s assumptions are presented. We develop two versions 
of the model which basically differ in the population configuring the economy. The first 
version considers a two-person world, reproducing the Van den Steen (2010a) main 
effects of differences in beliefs on entrepreneurship, and its relationship with the 
internal organization of a firm, i.e., (1) the allocation of formal authority and (2) the 
distribution of output. The present paper contrasts with Van den Steen (2010a) in its 
stress on financial concerns. The owner’s need for financial support in order to develop 
                                                 
4 See Business Demography Statistics provided by Eurostat.  
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/european_business/special_sbs_topics/business_demography 
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entrepreneurial projects is endogenously derived in our model. The second version of 
the model analyzes how creditors’ priorities affect the amount of financial support 
needed by the owner for the establishment of the firm. 
 
Persons live two periods (0,1). At Period 0 each person i is endowed with some 
resources whose monetary value is their initial wealth (Ai). This wealth can be shared 
between production and consumption activities. The amounts dedicated to production 
activities are {li}. In Period 0, li represents the assets in the economy provided by 
Person i for productive activities. In other words, li is the availability for financing 
productive activities by Person i. This amount could be cash, goods, or time. For 
expositional purposes, we assume that this last input is the case; 
2.1. Agents’ preferences 
il  represents the 
monetary value assigned to the leisure time which is sacrificed in production activities 
(i.e., the opportunity cost of working). Then, the amount of money available for Person 
i´s consumption at Period 0 will be Ai - li ≡ mi. 
For simplicity, let us assume that it is not in the interest of the persons to take 
lending/borrowing activities for consumption purposes. In other words, mi can be 
considered the amount of money available for Person i´s consumption at Period 0 when 
the financial market is in equilibrium. It is far from our purpose to model such  
equilibrium, but we assume that deviances will have costs. If Person i deviates from the 
equilibrium by lending ki to Person –i at Period 0, they incur in a social cost of Rki, 
where R is a non-negative constant denoting the costs per monetary unit of such a 
deviation. In our model, ki will be positive only when it is strictly needed for 
establishing a productive activity that is in the interest of Person i (detailed in the next 
section). So, it is expected that this person will assume all of the social cost Rki. In fact, 
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the agent who assumes the social costs becomes irrelevant when the analyses are based 
on the expected social welfare, as we assume. The initial wealth limits such payments: 
ki ≤ Ai - li ≡ mi.  
At Period 1, persons only consume the output that production activities generate. 
Let wi be the monetary value of expected output appropriated by Person i. Then, the 
welfare increase (utility) obtained from production activities by Person i can be written 
in monetary terms as: 
ui ≡ wi - li  - Rki .                                                                                 (1) 
See Appendix I for further discussion on the financial market equilibrium and 
how this utility function can be derived from a more general inter-temporal utility 
function in such equilibrium. Our point is merely that changing this financial 
equilibrium (ki>0) has an opportunity cost (Rki>0). 
 
2.2. Production activities
All of the production activities at Period 0 require the same volume of financial 
support, , but they can provide different production levels at Period 1. The economy 
production q will be the result of the set of actions ai that each Person i makes with 
input li. Those actions can be summarized by a vector a = (a1, …, ai,…). Persons can 
have different beliefs due to different predictions about future output given those 
actions. Function 
  
)(ˆ aqi  summarizes such beliefs. For the sake of tractability, let us 
assume that, based on their beliefs, there are only three possible types of persons5
                                                 
5 For exposition purposes, we assume that E is a woman and Ws are men. 
 (i=E, 
W, W1). Then, we restrict the analysis to just three vectors of actions (later on, we relax 
 16 
this assumption) or alternative sets of production activities, the ones that each type of 
Person i believes they are the optimal ones: ai = arg max ( )(ˆ aqi ), so )(ˆ)(ˆ jiii aqaq ≥ . 
The case where production is developed without collaboration between the agents 
will be considered as the benchmark situation, aW1= (aW11, … , aW1i,…). In other words, 
W1 does not know how to improve past outputs. Everybody agrees that the expected 
output that Agent i obtains by making use of his own time is li, so ∑==
i
iWi lqaq ˆ)(ˆ 1 , 
and∑ =
i
iu 0  .
 
This situation can be considered as a benchmark situation in the sense that it can 
represent an economy in equilibrium. From that point of view, persons with potentially 
new ideas may appear; in our case, Persons E and W. Entrepreneurs have been 
described in the literature as persons that break initial equilibrium with path-breaking 
ideas about how inputs can be combined (Schumpeter, 1939). These ideas are captured 
by assuming that agents can have different beliefs about the best use that can be given to 
the productive assets, for example, agents’ time.  
Consider now the second production activity, aE = (a E1, …, a Ei,…). Using Van 
den Steen´s (2010a) terminology, we define this activity as Persons E’s interpersonal 
authority. The idea is that Persons E need to convince somebody j to change his 
preferred actions. Then, Persons E do not agree with W1 (a EE≠ a W1E), and want others 
to follow their instructions: for somebody j, a Ej≠ a W1j . For the sake of simplicity, from 
now on let us assume that for all of the population, a Ei≠ aW1i (in other words, we restrict 
the analysis to the set of persons fulfilling the last condition). Person E believes that the 
output obtained will be Eqˆ  = Eqˆ  (aE), a measure of E´s self-confidence in their own 
projects.  
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A third production activity is aW = (a W1, …, a Wi,…). We call this activity Persons 
W interpersonal authority. The only difference with the case above is that we assume 
that Persons W are less confident in their own ideas than is E in hers, i.e., they have less 
self-confidence in their projects. In formal terms, they believe that the output obtained 
will be Wqˆ  = Wqˆ  (aW) , with Wqˆ < Eqˆ .  
For the derivation of our results, all that we need is that agents have different 
degrees of self-confidence in their projects. In order to make it clear that our results are 
not reduced to the case where one agent is more optimistic than the others, we assume 
that Persons E are not more optimistic than Person W: Wqˆ  = Wqˆ  (aW) > Eqˆ  (aW). Figure 
1 summarizes the variables used in next sections. We also assume that all the expected 
results are publicly known. It does not mean that the internal ways in which beliefs are 
built up by agents are public information, but rather only their effects on expected 
outputs. 
 
Figure 1. Output predictions for different production activities 
  Production activities 
 
P 
 No Collaboration 
aW1 
E interpersonal authority 
aE 
W interpersonal authority 
aW 
R 
E 
D 
Persons E  qˆ  Eqˆ  Eqˆ  (aW) 
I 
C 
T 
Persons W  qˆ  Wqˆ  (aE) Wqˆ  
I 
O 
N 
Persons W1 qˆ  1ˆWq  (aE) 1ˆWq  (aW) 
 
In Appendix II, we relate our modeling with the probabilistic model of 
differences in beliefs developed by Boot et al. (2006) and Van den Steen (2010a). An 
important difference with Van den Steen (2010a) is that differences in beliefs persist 
even when assets are already available for production. In fact, in such models 
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contractual arrangements are developed in prevision of future disagreements, while our 
model is based on current disagreements about the results of a particular project. 
Appendix II also analyzes the difference between beliefs and risk aversion, and the 
implications for the analysis of authority.   
 
 At Period 0, persons make arrangements and actions are taken with the inputs 
available (time, li). At Period 1, output (q) is obtained. Actions and production are 
observable and publicly known (and therefore contractible) at the beginning of Period 0, 
before production activities are implemented.  
2.3. Institutional Arrangements: Contracts and costs 
Therefore, different kinds of agreements can arise: 
a) Market. Persons take decisions on production activities with their input 
factors (time): everybody chooses what to do with their own assets. The output obtained 
by Person i is the income obtained at Period 1, wi. Proprietorships without employees 
appear. In this case, the vector of actions aW1 is implemented. This solution can be 
associated with the market solution; see Easterbrook and Fischel’s (1989) terminology.  
In fact, we are going to assume that when a vector of actions can be implemented by the 
market, this arrangement will be the most efficient one for implementing such vector of 
actions. For example, a person can contract other persons to perform actions aW1, paying 
them amount i
i
Wii laqw == )(ˆ 1 . We assume that writing such contracts has a small 
(negligible) cost. Thus, the market is the most efficient arrangement to implement the 
vector of actions aW1.  
 b) Firm: Interpersonal authority. The production activities aE or aW are 
implemented. Persons (-i, workers) have to decide whether to use their inputs (l-i) 
according to Persons i (entrepreneurs) beliefs or according to their own beliefs (
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i
i
i
i aa
−
−
− ≠ , workers). The way to convince those persons is through a contract signed at 
Period 0. We identify “firm” with those contracts, which must establish: 
b1) Authority over the inputs: Entrepreneur. Which actions (aE vs. aW) will be adopted? 
b2) Output property rights. How is output q (value created by the firm) shared by the 
agents? 
  We restrict our analysis to linear “sharing contracts” based on the (ex-post) 
output. For example, we rule out situations in which i offers -i a certain salary for taking 
actions (ai) if the final output is qˆ -i (ai), and zero otherwise.6
wi  = si  + pi q, 
 Then, income wi obtained 
by Person i at Period 1 is: 
where si represents the payment received from (si >0) or paid to the other agents (si<0).  
The variable pi represents the share (0 ≤ pi ≤ 1) of the team wealth (output) received by 
person i, so∑ =
i
ip 1.  
b3)  Entrepreneur financing: Corporation vs. Sole-proprietorship.  
For the establishment of the firm, it could be the case that the entrepreneur has to 
advance in Period 0 more money than that initially required (ki>0). Two ways of 
providing this amount of money can be considered: Sole-proprietorship and 
Corporation. In the case of a Sole-proprietorship, ki is simply the payments made at 
Period 0. In the case that, at the beginning of the relationship a corporation is created, ki 
represents the capital of the corporation. In this case, li can be considered as the owner’s 
contributions to the Corporation which are not in the balance sheet. At Period 0, the 
Corporation’s balance sheet specifies the assets, l-i, and how they have been financed: 
                                                 
6 This fact would represent a bet on the ex-post output, and the assumption we make is fairly close to the 
no-gambling constraint in Meza and Southey (1996) or Van den Steen (2007). Furthermore, the model in 
the text can be considered to be a simple version of a more complex one, where “betting contracts” are 
inefficient because they induce undesirable behaviors in workers (See Appendix III for further details). 
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corporation capital, ki, and liabilities (l-i - ki).  For simplicity, let us call ki the firm’s 
capital. 
The difference is that corporation laws establish the creditors’ priorities in the 
liquidation of the firm, i.e., ways of distributing the output and the firm’s capital are 
established. In the case of sole-proprietorship, such a list of creditor priorities is more 
diffuse, if it exists at all (for a further discussion, see Hansmann and Krakmann, 2000, 
specially p. 407-409). The existence of this list of creditor priorities could affect (or not) 
the amount of capital that the entrepreneur must advance at Period 0. We can identify d 
with the difference in capital needs between sole-proprietorship firms and corporations.   
 Arruñada (2012, p.161-167) argued that those guarantees are not free, so 
corporations are expected to have higher bureaucratic costs c≥0 (mainly related to the 
registry procedures associated with the legal form of the firm).7
Figure 2. Contractual Nomenclature 
 Corporations will be 
established if Rd > c. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that bureaucratic costs are 
small, c ≈0 (later on, we relax this assumption). So in this model, a necessary condition 
for establishing a Corporation is that it reduces the capital needs required for developing 
a certain entrepreneurial project , d>0. Figure 2 summarizes the possible contracts and 
their denominations. 
 
Market Solution: 
There are no employees. 
Firm: 
There are employees (Formal Authority) 
 Firm legal form: 
Sole proprietorship: 
No affirmative asset partitioning. 
Entrepreneurial creditors have no specific protection. 
 
Corporation: 
Affirmative asset partitioning. 
Entrepreneurial creditors have specific protection: 
Capital and creditor priorities 
 
                                                 
7 It could be argued that, depending on the firms, the Corporation tax treatment is different, so for some 
firms c<0 and that explains the incorporation of those firms. We do not consider this case.  
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Following the terminology of Easterbrook and Fischel (1989, Section II) and Hansmann and Kraakman 
(2000), see Table 1. 
 
It must be noted that corporations without employees have not been explicitly 
considered as a possible arrangement. It is easy to see that this kind of arrangement 
arises if we reinterpret li as a productive input different from labor. 
 
For the sake of illustration, two model versions are presented here that differ in 
the population that configures the economy. In the first case only two persons exist, E 
and W. This is a simplifying way to say that in an economy in equilibrium two 
competing entrepreneurial ideas for using the same volume of resources appear. So by E 
we identify the set of persons (with the same beliefs) which are more self-confident in 
their entrepreneurial idea. From the rest of the population, we identify by W the set of 
persons (with the same beliefs) who are more confident in E’s entrepreneurial idea. 
Persons W can provide (at the same cost and requiring no more guarantees than the rest 
of population) all the external resources (lW) demanded for developing E’s 
entrepreneurial idea. Persons W also have an entrepreneurial idea for using the same 
resources. 
2.4.  Different model versions based on population composition 
In this first case, the creditors’ priorities list does not play any role because there 
is only one possible creditor, so d = 0. Then, strictly speaking, only three kinds of 
arrangements can appear: market, sole-proprietorship without (ki=0) and with capital 
(ki>0). We refer to these solutions as market, sole-proprietorship (ki=0) and corporation 
(ki>0). The reason for this notation is that when we extend the model to include persons 
of type W1 (Version 2) in the population, we show that a list of creditors’ preferences 
reduces the capital requirements of the firm (ki), so that d>0. Thus, in those cases, 
corporations would be established whenever ki>0. In other words, the corporation will 
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be created with the minimum social capital required, and only when capital is strictly 
necessary to create the firm. The remaining features of the first version´s solution are 
maintained. This second version can be understood as an extension of the first version, 
with the only difference that now Persons W cannot provide all of the external resources 
demanded for developing E’s entrepreneurial idea. So the entrepreneurial project 
requires financial support from people even less confident in it than is Person W.  
We must note that, in the first version of the model, there is a bilateral 
negotiation between E and W. In order to provide a solution, we need to exogenously 
specify the agents’ bargaining power (for convenience, we consider that Person W’s 
bargaining power is t∈[0,1]). Thus, Person W appropriates a wealth equal to t times the 
expected wealth created by the firm, according to his beliefs. When we extend the 
model to more agents competing for a job (Version 2), the entrepreneur appropriates all 
of the wealth.   
 
3.  Model version 1: Main results  
 In this section, we assume that the number of agents in the economy is two, 
Person E and Person W. We characterize Pareto-optimal contracts among credible ones. 
Pareto-optimal contracts are those under which none of the agents can improve without 
worsening the other, and credible contracts are understood to be those that can be 
fulfilled according to both persons’ beliefs. We consider more than two agents in Model 
2, Section 4, where payment guarantees are used to analyze the optimal legal form of 
the firm. 
 
3.1. Main propositions 
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First, assuming that the wealth constraint corresponding to E is not binding, we 
relate the optimal income share with the allocation of decision rights (Proposition 1), 
reproducing Van den Steen´s (2010a) results. Second, we discuss how wealth 
constraints can affect the legal form of the firm (Proposition 2). 
From the assumptions made in Section 2, it is plain to see that E and W will 
prefer the market solution to any other solution if they believe that team production is 
not more productive than is working separately, lE + lW ≥ Eqˆ ≥ Wqˆ . In such a case, each 
person keeps property rights, i.e., (i) the authority to choose how to use the 
corresponding inputs (time), as well as (ii) the right to appropriate the output. Then, a 
necessary condition for the existence of joint production is that at least one agent 
believes that team production will generate more wealth than will the market solution, 
Eqˆ > lE + lW. From now on, we assume that Eqˆ > lE + lW. 
Furthermore, differences in beliefs will also have implications on the income 
share. In fact, authority implies that Person E will appropriate the entire output. The 
following proposition summarizes these ideas. 
 
Proposition 1:
WE qq ˆˆ >
 If E has no financial constraints (mi is high enough), joint production, 
where E assumes the authority and appropriates the whole output, is the optimal 
agreement. Otherwise, the market solution is the preferred one (recall that ). 
 
Proof 0ˆˆ >− WE qq:   Given that  and 0) (ˆ W >+− llq EE , the set of Pareto equilibria is 
necessarily reached by means of joint production following E’s instructions, 
because it makes it possible to attain the maximum output among the feasible 
ones. Thus, the expected welfare associated with any other way of organizing 
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the production can be improved by the two agents (taking into account that by 
means of lateral payments from E to W the latter one can also get better). 
 In particular, the set of sharing-rules of output where E and W, 
respectively, appropriate tlqE −−  ˆ W  and sW  lW +t, with 
WEWWEE llqtllq −−>>−− ˆˆ , is Pareto optimal, and the Pareto frontier is 
thus parameterized by t. Parameter t indicates the rents that Person W expects 
to appropriate (in accordance with his beliefs and the arrangements finally 
established). Then, it is optimal for E and W that the last one renounces 
authority and the first one assumes it. On the other hand, the wealth attainable 
also depends on who appropriates the output; one should take into account 
that sharing an output which has a greater value for E than for W cannot be 
Pareto optimal, because it can be improved by paying W a fixed salary. 
When lE + lW > iqˆ  for all i, the market is the solution preferred by both 
agents. In the market solution, each person has the authority to choose how to 
use their own inputs (time), they obtain the consequences of their actions wi = 
li, and there is no need for delaying consumption, so ki=0. All of the agents 
believe that those payments can be made and nobody can improve their utility 
without harming the others. Then, a necessary condition for the existence of a 
firm is that at least one agent believes that a firm will generate more wealth 
than will the market solution, Eqˆ > qˆ . ♦ 
 
Therefore, differences in beliefs influence the optimal way of sharing the joint 
output. When Person E has no financial constraints and Eqˆ  > lE + lW, we have seen that 
W prefers to totally renounce sharing the (ex-post) output. The reason is simple: he can 
improve his welfare by renouncing authority, which implies that E will take decisions 
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that (according to W’s beliefs) are not the best ones. Then W will prefer an ex ante fixed 
payment rather than sharing the future output, and the output will be appropriated by the 
agent with authority.  
So, at this point we can identify E as an entrepreneur who keeps the property 
rights, while W is identified as an employee who follows the entrepreneur’s 
instructions, earning an ex-ante fixed salary.  
 It is worth noting that Proposition 1 is silent about kE and, consequently, about 
the legal form that the common enterprise adopts, i.e., whether it becomes a corporation 
or a sole-proprietorship business. This occurs because E has unlimited initial wealth. As 
shown above, when Eqˆ  > lE + sW, the set of contracts satisfying (i), the output is 
appropriated by E (pE =1- pW =1) and (ii) wages fulfill Eqˆ  - lE ≥ sW = -sE ≥ lW, then is 
Pareto optimal. However, without companies (kE = 0) and whenever E’s initial wealth is 
finite, the contract may not be credible for W. The reason is that W could believe that E 
will not be able to fulfill the commitments she has acquired. In particular, he may 
believe that the output will be smaller than the salary committed to at the beginning of 
the relationship, Wqˆ (aE) < sW. In this case, the worker will require legal guarantees to 
ensure that he will receive his salary, sW; for example, through the constitution of a firm 
with initial capital kE  ≥ sW  - Wqˆ (aE)> 0. The following result analyzes the determinants 
of the legal form adopted by the common enterprise.  
 
Proposition 2:
(a) E will become a sole proprietor if W believes that by following E’s instructions the 
team can attain a certain level of output (
   
Wqˆ  (aE) ≥ sW). Otherwise, E will create a 
corporation whenever her initial wealth is sufficiently large (mE ≥ sW - Wqˆ (aE)).  
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(b) If E does not have enough initial wealth (mE < sW - Wqˆ  (aE) ) and W believes that, 
following his instructions, team production will attain a certain level ( Wqˆ  (aW) > lE + 
sW), then W will become a sole proprietor whenever E believes that by following W’s 
instructions the team will attain a certain level of output ( Eqˆ  (aW)≥ sE). Otherwise, W 
will create a corporation whenever his initial wealth is sufficiently large (mW ≥ sE -  Eqˆ  
(aW)).   
(c) If none of the conditions above hold, it is impossible for W to get a positive rent t 
(with sW = lW + t), and the market solution will arise.  
 
Proof
 
: Immediate from the exposition above. 
A firm becomes an arrangement whereby the two people perform the best 
actions according to one person’s beliefs (henceforth, the entrepreneur), while the other 
person accepts the entrepreneur’s authority (the worker). From Proposition 1, this 
arrangement is optimal because both agents maximize their respective welfares: the 
entrepreneur by means of appropriating a superior rent than by working on behalf of W 
or working by herself; the worker, by receiving a fixed salary that beats any other kind 
of compensation available, thus renouncing authority and ex-post income share, i.e., 
renouncing property rights. Otherwise, the market solution arises (everybody acts 
according to their own beliefs, owning a business without employees).  
3.2. Implications: The legal form of the firm depending on W’s negotiation power 
Proposition 2 establishes the conditions for the existence of the different 
arrangements considered as firms: E being a sole proprietor or creating a corporation, 
and W being a sole proprietor or creating a corporation. The solution depends on the 
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confidence in the other one’s project, on one´s own wealth, and on their bargaining 
power. Figure 3 summarizes all of these situations.  
 
 
Figure 3. The firm’s legal form 
 
       
 E as entrepreneur  W as entrepreneur  
 Sole proprietorship Corporation  Corporation Sole proprietorship  
      t 
0      1 
             
Wqˆ (aE) - lW 
 
mE 
  
1- mW 
 
1-( Eqˆ (aW) – lE) 
 
       
       
 Assumption: Wqˆ - qˆ  >0 .       
       
 
In a two-person economy, the final agreement is the result of a bilateral 
bargaining process between E and W. So, to construct Figure 3, variables have been 
expressed in terms of the maximum rent that joint production can generate according to 
W’s beliefs: Wqˆ - lE - lW =1.  
When the exogenous bargaining power (t) is lower than or equal to W’s 
confidence in E’s project (measured as φW (aE) - lW), E becomes a sole proprietor (t = sW 
- lW ≤ φW (aE) - lW). Otherwise, E needs to provide some payment guarantees (social 
capital: kE ≥ sW - Wqˆ  (aE) = t-( Wqˆ  (aE) - lW) >0). Then, she will establish a corporation 
whenever she has enough wealth to do so, mE  + Wqˆ  (aE) - lW ≥ t. Taking into account 
that, in general, nothing imposes that Wqˆ (aE) - lW < 1 or that mE  + Wqˆ  (aE) - lW < 1.  In 
the first case ( Wqˆ (aE) - lW >1), only E will appear as a sole proprietor, and in the second 
one (mE > 1- Wqˆ  (aE) + lW >0) E will be the entrepreneur, adopting one or another form 
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for the firm depending on the worker’s (W) bargaining power, in other words, sole 
proprietorship when Wqˆ (aE) - lW >t, and a corporation otherwise.  
Obviously, in those cases where E cannot be the entrepreneur because of her 
wealth limitations, (mE + Wqˆ (aE) - lW < t), W has the opportunity to become the 
entrepreneur (in this case, t = 1- sE). Then, W will be a sole proprietor if E trusts in W’s 
project, Eqˆ  (aW) – lE , expecting that W will assure her salary (whenever sE = 1- t ≤ Eqˆ
(aW) – lE). In the cases where such confidence is not high enough (sE = 1- t > Eqˆ  (aW) – 
lE), W will need to offer payment guarantees to E (who becomes the worker in this case) 
by creating a corporation with kW ≥ sE - ( Eqˆ (aW) – lE ). Those guarantees can only be 
offered if W has sufficient wealth, (sE = 1- t ≥ mW + ( Eqˆ (aW) – lE)); otherwise, W 
cannot obtain any positive rent t. If Person W cannot obtain a positive rent (mE + Wqˆ
(aE) - lW < 0 and mW + Eqˆ (aW)  – lE  < 0), then the market solution arises. 
We have solved the model extending the set of possible actions to more than two 
(results available upon request), and relaxing the restrictions concerning the value of the 
model parameters: the firm’s establishment costs (c>0), and that the person who 
eventually develops the idea (and manages the business) is more confident in the 
project´s results ( Wqˆ > Eqˆ (aW)). Although more complications can be added to the 
analysis, the main intuitions of the basic model remain. 
 
4.  Model version 2: Several creditors  
Let us now consider a population with a Person E (i=1) and a number of persons 
of type W1 (i=2,3,…). For expositional simplicity, let us also assume that li=l for all i. 
Person E believes that production can be improved, Eqˆ > qˆ  , if two persons of type W1 
(from now on, Persons 2 and 3) change their actions, but Eqˆ  does not depend on who 
 29 
the persons of type W1 are that change their actions. But a certain person of type W1 
(Person 2 from now on) is more confident in E’s entrepreneurial project than in others, 
Eqˆ > qˆ > 2ˆ =iq  (aE) > 2ˆ >iq  (aE).  
We also assume that mE > qˆ - lE= 2l > 2ˆ >iq (aE). From Propositions 1 and 2, all of 
these assumptions are equivalent to assuming that (i) Person E will be the entrepreneur 
of a firm with two workers, persons of type W1, and (ii) she has to provide capital to the 
entrepreneurial activity, kE > 0. In this section our attention is focused on the minimum 
capital (kE) needed to start the firm, assuming that all of the contracts are publicly 
known. 
As a starting point, let us consider the situation in that l ≥ 2qˆ  (aE)  > 2ˆ >iq  (aE) 
≥0. This is the case where the entrepreneur has to pay the maximum possible amount of 
money at Period 0, i.e., the sum of workers’ wages:  kEMax = ∑∑
==
=
3,23,2 i
i
i
i ls =2l. 
Otherwise, the contracts would not be credible from the workers’ point of view.   
When  2qˆ  (aE) > l, the amount advanced by the entrepreneur at Period 0 can be 
reduced to some extent, kEMax-kE >0, which is paid at Period 1. The minimum amount of 
capital needed to make the contracts credible for all creditors is: 
kE = f l + (2l - 2qˆ  (aE)) h. 
The variables f and h are dummy variables: h takes the value of 1 if 2l - 2qˆ  (aE) ≥ 
0, and 0 otherwise. The variable f takes the value of 1 if 2ˆ >iq ≤ l , and 0 otherwise. If f 
=1 and h=1, the contract establishes that worker Person 3 will receive his salary at 
Period 0. When f =0 and h=1, worker Person 3 will receive (2l - 2qˆ  (aE)) at Period 0 
together with the guarantee that he will be the first creditor to be paid at Period 1. The 
total debt of the entrepreneur will be 2qˆ  (aE) >l, so this contract is credible according to 
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the beliefs of Persons 2 and 3.  When f =0 and h=0, the capital needed to create the firm 
is zero whenever Person 3 has priority as a creditor. If Person 3 does not have priority 
as a creditor, the contracts above are not credible and the entrepreneur has to advance 
more money. In summary, the remaining persons of type W1 can be considered perfect 
substitutes of Person 2 as workers, but not as creditors. 
 Corporation laws can be seen as rules providing mechanisms which (i) 
guarantee that creditors have priority over entrepreneurs in the distribution of output; 
(ii) establish priorities among the creditors and (iii) guarantee that firms make public 
such information, i.e., credits and priorities.  
From the arguments above, the advanced payments needed by a sole proprietor 
(kESP) to develop the firm will be greater than (or at least equal to) those required by a 
corporation (kE, and d = kESP - kE ≥0). The arguments above can be summarized in the 
following result. 
 
Proposition 3
 
: Consider an entrepreneur (E) who has to advance some money to 
establish a firm, kEMax. If the establishment costs of the corporation are sufficiently low, 
E will adopt the corporation as the legal form. Otherwise, sole proprietorship will be 
chosen. 
Proof
So, when guarantees are required by creditors, such guarantees will be 
provided in the cheapest way: a corporation if Rd > c; a sole proprietorship 
:  The costs corresponding to the corporation can be expressed as the legal 
establishment costs (c) plus the social financial costs of capital (RkE): c+RkE. 
The cost of adopting the sole proprietorship legal form is RkSP, the social 
financial cost of the money given in advance.  
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otherwise. If the legal costs are low enough, c<cMAX = Rd, a corporation will be 
preferred rather than a sole proprietorship. Thus, cMAX establishes a threshold 
up to which the corporation is the preferred legal form of the firm. ♦ 
5.  Empirical Implications 
The model predicts that differences in the stakeholders’ confidence regarding 
entrepreneurial projects would affect the internal financial support needed, favoring the 
existence of a public creditors’ priority list. If the legal form is interpreted as a proxy of 
the existence of such a list of creditors, the model has implications in the adoption of the 
legal form of the firm. 
This topic has scarcely been analyzed from the empirical point of view. Previous 
studies have used differences in taxes (Gentry and Hubbard, 2000; Schuetze, 2000; 
Bruce, 2000) or bankruptcy regimes (Fan and White, 2003) to empirically explain the 
adoption of the legal form of businesses by entrepreneurs. Cole (2011) empirically 
relates the adoption of the legal form to the financial structure of the business; some of 
his evidence can be interpreted, using our model.  
The model has been developed under the assumption that all firms have the 
same number of employees. But it is easy to extend the arguments to the case in which 
there are greater differences in confidence levels among stakeholders when projects are 
bigger. If bureaucratic costs do not increase with scale (so they are approximately 
similar for all of the firms empirically compared), the model predicts a positive 
relationship between the size of the firm and “corporation” as the legal form adopted.  
The most intrinsic prediction of the model is that, even when we control for the 
number of employees, we should expect differences in the way that firms will be 
financially supported. In this case, the first prediction is that corporations will have 
higher levels of owners’ financial support or capital. This is due to the fact that 
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differences in confidence between the entrepreneur(s) and the rest of the stakeholders 
are higher. One way to reduce such needs of capital, so that the firm be established as 
“sole-proprietorship”, is that the entrepreneur(s) select creditors among those more 
confident in the entrepreneurial project, such as friends or family. In this case, we 
expect that corporations will be (relatively) less financially supported by family and 
friends. This is also consistent with Storey’s (1994) evidence that corporations are 
relatively more financed by banks. Furthermore, the model predicts that, in sole 
proprietorships, the owner gets financial support by advancing payments to the 
stakeholders (and corporations will have higher liabilities and will be less financially 
constrained).    
A key prediction of the model is that those differences in financing are related to 
differences in beliefs (or confidence in the entrepreneurial project). Some personal 
features of the entrepreneur or the entrepreneurial project can be associated with greater 
differences in confidence. This could be the case with the education of the entrepreneur 
or the use of tangible versus intangible assets. The fact that entrepreneurial projects 
proposed by more educated people (or using a large proportion of intangible assets) are 
more difficult to evaluate implies the expectation of higher differences in confidence in 
the projects suggested. This demands for the development of further empirical research 
that evaluates the role of these features and others, like risk-aversion or optimism. 
Finally, the model remains silent about the performance of the firm. Frankish et 
al. (2013) provide some evidence relating the lifespan of the firm with its legal form. If 
entrepreneurs do not change their beliefs, due to constant losses along time, those firms 
with higher capital (i.e., corporations) are expected to last longer.  
 
6. Conclusions and Extensions 
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 This paper shows, in a very simple and integrated way, that differences in beliefs 
regarding the optimal use of productive inputs can explain a broad array of features 
frequently considered as defining features of the firm: well-defined decision-making 
authority; concentration of property rights in the entrepreneur; the need for personal 
wealth to establish firms; the effect of creditors’ priorities on the entrepreneur’s initial 
contribution, and the eventually adopted legal form. This simplicity contrasts with other 
current theories of the firm (see Gibbons, 2005). Our explanation diverges from 
previous papers like De Mezza and Southey (1996) and Van den Steen (2010a) in that 
differences in beliefs are not identified with optimism or risk-appetite, nor do they 
finally converge into a unified belief. Furthermore, it introduces payment guarantees as 
a determinant of the financial structure of the firm. 
 Obviously, the paper leaves many questions open for further research. First, it 
limits the analysis of the legal form to one feature, the list of creditors’ priorities. Legal 
forms have many other features, so further research is needed to understand the role of 
those features and the adoption of alternative legal forms as different types of 
corporations, cooperatives or non-profit organizations, among others. 
Second, the paper does not address how beliefs evolve over time. Thus, we do 
not analyze the origin of differences in beliefs, so the model remains silent on some 
relevant questions. Entrepreneurial teams or how firms or corporations can stimulate 
entrepreneurship among their employees are two examples. Another one is the 
compatibility of differences in beliefs with characteristics of the firm’s growth process 
(such as, for example, decisions regarding the delegation process inside firms, or the 
separation between ownership and management). 
More or less explicitly, our model assumes that differences in beliefs remain 
important along time, so this will also be the case for the legal form of the firm. Parker’s 
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(2006) empirical evidence suggests that entrepreneurs only partially update their prior 
beliefs to new information/data. Additionally, there are theoretical arguments 
suggesting that the convergence in beliefs is difficult. 
In fact, in modeling beliefs, we have only considered three elements: actions, 
predictions and theories (i.e., how persons derive their predictions from the set of 
actions). We have assumed that they are publicly known, because it is fairly easy to 
transmit information about actions and predictions regarding their monetary 
consequences (in fact, it is reasonable to suppose that negotiations are carried out by 
pooling actions and predictions). Though irrelevant for the present model, this 
assumption seems much less realistic for the transmission of theories. In fact, human-
capital variables used in empirical studies (years of schooling, work experience) have 
been interpreted as indicators of the time required to learn such theories. 
In a more dynamic context, there may be other variables, regardless of people’s 
actions, which may also affect production. In a static model like ours, those variables 
are irrelevant because their values are given, but in a dynamic context they are likely to 
play a relevant role. The evolution of the theories, or learning process, is not only 
affected by the knowledge of the different theories, but also by the information about 
the actions finally performed by the members of the organization and by other relevant 
(according to the different theories) variables. As collecting information is expensive, it 
depends on the knowledge of theories previously acquired. In a context where 
entrepreneurs or top managers select the information that the firm can generate (and 
where they have better information about the consequences of workers’ actions), it is 
somewhat unrealistic to think that differences in beliefs will disappear quickly, as soon 
as production is completed. Furthermore, differences in beliefs can arise because one of 
the agents thinks in the short-term while the other thinks in the long-term. As long-term 
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and short-term benefits are difficult to compare, both agents may well continue to hold 
divergent beliefs that barely converge over time. Notice that even if people are rational 
and share the same objectives and historical data, Kurz (1994b) shows that more than 
one theory might not be rejected by the data. So for all of these reasons (difficulties in 
learning theories and differences in information), we think that differences in beliefs 
will persist, and, consequently, that most of our results could be maintained in a 
dynamic context.  
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APPENDIX I: FINANCIAL MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND UTILITY ASSUMPTIONS 
 
We have assumed that at Period 0 the financial market is in a situation of equilibrium in 
the sense that persons have no interest to perform (more) lending/borrowing 
transactions. Let us characterize this equilibrium by a minimum return required for the 
production activities rM and the decisions on goods consumption and production assets 
at Period 0:  
Production assets ( 0il ). The assets dedicated to production by Person i in Period 0. 
Consumption (mi =Ai- 0il ). Non-production assets or goods, those dedicated to 
consumption by Person i in Period 0. 
Our focus is about decisions on the use of production assets. The distribution of the 
output generated by production activities at Period 1 implies a monetary income to 
Person i of wi. Persons value the different production activities according to wi - li, 
where il = (1+ rM) 0il , and the changes that they will imply in the equilibrium situation 
described above.  
An easy way to grasp all of these assumptions is through the following inter-temporal 
utility function of the agents ( tiu is the utility at period t): 
iU = 0iu  (1+ rM) + 1iu  = (Ai - 0il  + rB bi – rL ki ) (1+ rM) +  (wi - bi (1+r) + ki (1+r)). 
The variable bi ≥0 indicates that Person i is borrowing at interest rate r. The increase of 
one euro in consumption increases its utility at Period 0 by rB. The variable ki ≥0 
indicates that Person i is lending at interest rate r. The decrease of one euro in 
consumption decreases his/her utility by rL. When bi > 0, then ki = 0 and vice versa. The 
market equilibrium implies that rB <1< rL. 
Then, we assume that whatever the price of the financial transaction is, r, there is a 
social cost R= (rL - rB ) (1+rM) > 0 associated with the fact that one Person i lends one 
euro to another –i,  ki = b-i =1.  This is justified in terms of market equilibrium deviance 
(rL - rB > 0). We assume that all of these costs are assumed by the lender (rB= (1+r) 
/(1+rM)). Then utility iU can be written as: 
iU = Ai (1+ rM) + iu  = Ai (1+ rM)  +  (wi - li - Rki). 
As we have assumed that Ai and rM are exogenously given, the different production 
activities can be compared by Person i in terms of ui= wi - li - Rki, the utility function 
proposed in the paper. 
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APPENDIX II: RISK AVERSION AND DIFFERENCES IN BELIEFS 
 
The general framework  
Following Van den Steen (2010a), actions (in our case, L= aE, aW) can be expressed as 
random variables (lotteries) with two possible realizations, V and v, with V>v; pi,L 
represents the probability associated with V, which can vary depending on the person 
(i=E,W) who values the action. For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, 
we normalize Ui(V) =1 and Ui(v) =0 for both persons, where Ui(·) represents the utility 
associated with Person i. 
 
The values associated with different actions 
According to Person i, the value (measured in terms of the certain equivalent CE) of a 
random variable, L, can be expressed as: CE i,L = Ui-1 (pi,L). Then, in the case of 
differences in beliefs (pE,L≠ pW,L)  and risk neutrality we can establish that: 
CE E, aE   = pE, aE    V +  (1- pE, aE ) v =  Eqˆ , 
CE W, aE   = pW, aE  V  + (1- pW, aE ) v = qˆ W (aE),   
CE E, aW   = pE, aW   V  + (1- pE, aW) v = qˆ E (aW), and  
CE W, aW  = pW, aW  V  + (1- pW, aW) v = .ˆWq  
But different values of the lotteries ( Eqˆ , qˆ W (aE), qˆ E (aW) and Wqˆ ) can also be 
obtained when there are no differences in beliefs, pE,L= pW,L = pL, but rather there are 
differences in the utility function of the agents: 
Eqˆ          = CE E, aE    = UE
-1 (p aE ),  
qˆ W (aE)  = CE W, aE   = UW-1 (p aE ), 
qˆ E (aW)  = CE E, aW   = UE-1 (p aW) and 
Wqˆ          = CE W, aW  = UW
-1 (p aW ). 
 
The difference: Disagreement in the social welfare. 
In the case where there are no differences in beliefs, pE,L= pW,L = pL, but there are 
differences in the utility functions, W agrees with E in the social welfare generated by 
the actions (L= aE, aW). For example, in the case that lottery aE is played by Person E, 
both agree that the social welfare will be: 
Eqˆ   = CE E,   aE = UE
-1 (p aE ),  
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but this will not be the case when there are differences in beliefs and risk neutrality. 
 
Analogously, when lottery aE is played by Person E: 
Social welfare for W will be equal to pW, aE   V + (1- pW, aE) v = qˆ W (aE)   ≠ pE, aE    V  +  
(1- pE, aE ) v = Eqˆ =social welfare according to E. 
Similar arguments can be replicated by changing the action and/or the person. 
So, what we assume is that persons disagree about the welfare generated by a certain 
action made by a certain person. 
 
Typology of situations 
 
a) No differences in beliefs: CE E,  aE  ≥ CE E, aW  and CE W, aE  ≥ CE W, aW  or    
    CE E, aE  ≤ CE E, aW  and CE W, aE  ≤ CE W, aW. 
 
In this case, both persons have the same preferences about actions. So, in a certain way, 
the output of the firm can be modeled as is usual in agency theory: a single lottery. 
There can be risk-neutral agents (CE E, aE =CE W, aE and CE E, aW =CE W, aW) or those 
without differences in terms of risk preferences (CE E, aE ≠  CE W, aE). 
 
b)  Differences in beliefs: The remaining cases. 
 b1) Optimism.8
                                      CE E, aE < CE W,  aE and  CE E, aW < CE W, aW.         
  CE E, aE > CE W, aE and  CE E, aW > CE W, aW or 
 
            b2.1) Differences in confidence:9
 
  CE E, aE >CE W, aW   or   CE E, aE < CE W, aW.     
 b2.2)  No differences in confidence:     CE E, aE = CE W, aW. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 De Meza and Southey (1996) is not a model of differences in beliefs. So, in their case, it is quite 
difficult to distinguish between optimism and differences in risk preferences. 
9 As defined by Van den Steen (2010a). 
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Beliefs about beliefs: 
Furthermore, Van den Steen (2010a) assumes that the firms have been established 
before beliefs are known by the persons and that beliefs are private information. So 
before taking some decisions it must be known the joint distribution of probabilities 
about the beliefs each person has, whether each player has different beliefs about the 
distributions of such probabilities. At this point the assumptions of the model are:  
i) There are no differences in beliefs concerning the joint distribution of 
beliefs. So both players share the same joint distribution. 
ii) Those distributions are independent. The beliefs of one person do not reveal 
about the beliefs of the other. 
iii) Initially, the distribution of probabilities concerning the beliefs that each 
person has is identical. 
 
With these assumptions, the only possible cases are (a) identical beliefs with risk-
neutral agents or (b) differences in beliefs with no differences in confidence. 
 
At a second step, Assumption iii) is modified, so at this point the possible cases are (a) 
equal beliefs with different degrees of risk aversion or (b) differences in beliefs with 
differences in confidence. 
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APPENDIX  III:  WHY NOT BETTING CONTRACTS? 
  
We argue that, although workers and entrepreneurs can establish a framework of 
compromises, the actions may be unverifiable by third parties. Usually, workers and 
entrepreneurs have better information about the situation of the firm than do third 
parties before output is finally obtained. When actions are not verifiable, betting 
contracts favor poor collaboration or even “sabotage” actions (like a fixed boxing 
match).  
Let us extend our basic model to incorporate such arguments. If a firm is created, the 
timing is as follows: 
 
 Agreement: 
Market solution. 
Firm:  
i Entrepreneur   
-i Worker 
 
 
 
Observable actions: 
ai  where i= E or W 
 
 
 
Information:  
I= iqˆ or I= qˆ -i (ai)  
 
 
 
Sabotage 
actions: 
d-i=1 or d-i=0 
 
 
Final output is 
obtained: 
Q=I -d-i ( iqˆ - qˆ -i (ai))  
1 2 3 4 5              Stages 
 
Before obtaining the final output q (step 5), entrepreneurs and workers have private, and 
consequently, non-contractible information (Step 3) about how things are. They know 
whether the firm works in accordance with the entrepreneur’s beliefs, I= Eqˆ , or workers’ 
beliefs, I= qˆ -i (ai). Given this information, the worker can decide (Step 4) to collaborate 
more or less actively with the team; in other words, perform actions to reduce 
production (d-i=1) or not (d-i=0). Those actions are not verifiable by third parties and, 
consequently, not contractible. The cost of such actions is practically null and the losses 
caused to the firm are equal to iqˆ - qˆ -i (ai). These five stages are fairly close to those 
used by Gibbons (2005, Sec. 4) to compare four theories of the firm. As can be checked, 
the key differences among the cited models are the assumptions about beliefs. The rest 
of the assumptions have been made before in other models. 
In such a situation, a (betting) contract where the entrepreneur pays L if q = iqˆ  and H> 
L if q= qˆ -i (ai) will never be offered by the entrepreneur because, if I= iqˆ  in Step 4, the 
worker would have incentives to perform sabotage actions, so the output obtained is q= 
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qˆ -i (ai) and the final wage is H. Thus, in Step 1 betting contracts can be improved by 
fixed wages equal to H, because output can be either q= iqˆ  or q = qˆ -i (ai). So the 
solution coincides with the solution of a simplified model with the following three steps 
(imposing now that betting contracts are ruled out, so there are no incentives for 
sabotage, d-i=0; this is what we do in the main text of the paper): 
 
 
Agreement: 
Market solution. 
Firm:  
i Entrepreneur   
-i Worker 
 
 
 
Observable actions: 
ai  where i= E or W 
 
 
 
Final output is 
obtained: 
q= iqˆ  or q= qˆ -i (ai)  
1 2 3             Stages 
 
 
